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Abstract 
This research paper focuses on two different interest rate risk measures used by credit 
unions in Canada, described by regulatory standards as complementary and 
indispensable.  These two measures pertain either sensitivity of market value or net 
interest income, caused by changes in interest rates. Whereas credit unions can relate 
to and understand the latter perspective, market value does not seem as relevant as 
credit unions hold assets and liabilities until maturity and are not exposed to changes in 
market value. We use data from three credit unions to explain the two measures and 
show that one can be expressed by the other, which in fact discredits the perceived 
complementary nature of both measures. Additionally, we further develop the concept 
of net interest income sensitivity to overcome the weaknesses of market value by 
employing a more realistic measurement of interest rate risk and a reduction of 
required capital which eventually would enable credit unions to operate more 
profitably. 
 
Keywords:  interest rate risk management in the banking book; market value; net interest 
income; credit unions; non-trading portfolio; regulatory capital requirements; Basel 
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1. Introduction 
The following research paper was written in cooperation with the partner 
organization PRO Financial Solutions (PRO) and supported by Mitacs through the Mitacs 
Accelerate program. All data used in this paper has been modified to protect proprietary 
information from PRO and their clients. The paper focuses on credit unions in Canada, 
but the ideas and results arising from this paper can be applied to any financial 
institution. 
Credit unions generate profits by lending money to customers at a certain 
interest rate – in the form of mortgages and loans – and funding these assets by 
collecting money from customers through deposits – such as chequing accounts – and 
other short-term liabilities. Credit unions operate sustainably and profitably when 
earning higher interest rates from customers than those they are paying. The difference 
between interest rates for lending and borrowing, also known as “the spread”, is the 
main driver of a credit union’s profitability. The predominant interest rate environment, 
expressed by the yield curve, influences the rates at which credit unions can lend and 
borrow and therefore directly impacts the firm’s profitability. It is crucial for credit 
unions to think about potential changes in the yield curve and how they could affect 
interest income. For instance, if the yield curve changed enough to cause higher overall 
interest rates payments to customers than those received by the credit union, that 
institution would realize losses, harming their own stability and ability to operate. As a 
  2 
result, managing interest rate risk plays a major part in a credit union’s overall risk 
management process.  
The importance of financial regulation and risk management has experienced 
increased attention after the financial crisis of 2008. The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) published standards for managing interest rate risk in the banking 
book (IRRBB). According to these standards, financial institutions are recommended to 
apply two different measures for a holistic management of interest rate risk (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), 2016). Both measures approach interest rate 
risk in a different way by looking either at the change of market value or the change of 
interest income.  
Market value is the amount of money a credit union would receive when selling 
assets or pay when refinancing liabilities. It is calculated by discounting all expected 
future cash flows under the current yield curve and, being a function of fixed cash flows 
and variable discount curves, it is sensitive to changes in the yield curve.  
On the other hand, net interest income is calculated as difference between 
interest income and expense. 
Given the descriptions above, the first risk measure aims to capture the 
exposure of credit unions to changes in market value. However, credit unions do not 
trade with assets and liabilities and therefore we would like to question whether credit 
unions should or should not care about the sensitivity of market value when measuring 
interest rate risk.  
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The second measure focuses on the institution’s earnings, or “the spread”, as 
discussed earlier. In contrast to market value, where the usefulness for non-trading 
financial institutions is unclear, the second risk measure is far more tangible as it 
analyses net interest income – the main profit and loss driver.  
In the current regulatory standards and research, these two measures are always 
perceived as complementing each other and are described as necessary for a successful 
management of interest rate risk. Yet, it is exactly the usefulness of market value 
sensitivity and the relationship between these two measures that PRO and their clients 
struggle to demonstrate. This research paper explains and compares the two risk 
measures and challenges their complementary nature as well as the importance they 
both hold for credit unions.  
In order to familiarize the reader with the current consensus on interest rate risk 
management for credit unions and to provide more details, chapter 2 will provide an 
overview over existing regulation and research.  
Based on the current research, we will focus on the market value perspective in 
chapter 3. We will define the sensitivity of market value in Section 3.1, describe the 
model used for calculating the sensitivity for three different credit unions and show the 
results in section 3.2 and 3.3 respectively. We will close chapter 3 with a discussion of 
the meaning of market value for credit unions in section 3.4 and will explain that the risk 
calculated with this tool, instead of measuring interest rate risk, actually estimates 
liquidity risk. Since liquidity risk is already captured under different regulatory standards 
we raise the concern, that the market value perspective exposes credit unions to capital 
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requirements that are too conservative. As a result, credit unions assume to have a risk 
tolerance far below their ability to take on risk, eventually jeopardizing profits. 
Keeping these doubts in mind, chapter 4 discusses the sensitivity of net interest 
income. We start with its definition in section 4.1 and provide a basic example showing 
under which conditions market value sensitivity equals net interest income sensitivity. 
This example rebuts the complementary nature of the two risk measurement tools and 
seriously casts a shadow of doubt over the usefulness of the recommended regulatory 
requirements, in other words, if both measures should be used by credit unions. One 
major assumption in this example is our decision to force an artificial cost on equity, 
increasing net interest income risk to the same amount as market value risk. In order to 
exclude the unreal cost of equity, section 4.2 extends the basic example to a more 
complex and realistic situation and explains how the model has to be adjusted for this 
matter. Section 4.3 discusses the results, explains the effect that the forced cost for 
equity has over the measurement of risk, and ultimately challenges the general 
understanding that market value is an adequate measure for interest rate risk in the 
banking book. Overall, chapter 4 not only disproves the need for a parallel use of both 
risk measures, but also indicates that market value sensitivity – compared to interest 
income sensitivity – imposes an absurd additional capital requirement for holding 
equity. This fact is especially surprising, as holding equity is the safest way to fund assets 
and should therefore support risk taking and not diminish it. 
Finally, chapter 5 summarizes our findings suggesting credit unions should focus 
on net interest income when measuring risk rather than using market value as the 
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former measure portrays a more realistic calculation of risk, demonstrates an increased 
ability to take on risk, and ultimately leads to increased returns. 
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2. Background 
This research project investigates the benefits or disadvantages that market 
value sensitivity and earnings sensitivity in the banking book bring to credit unions and 
other financial institutions not subject to fair market valuation. Credit unions in British 
Columbia are regulated by the Financial Institutions Commission (FICOM) under the 
Financial Institutions Act (Financial Institutions Commission (FICOM), 1990) which is 
primarily based on Basel I. The capital regulation was written over 20 years ago and 
does not contain a market risk perspective. Most credit unions in BC are highly 
capitalized and are therefore already compliant to Basel III capital requirements. The 
research objective of this paper mainly arises from the requirements for interest rate 
risk in the banking book (IRRBB) and aims at questioning their usefulness to credit 
unions and other financial institutions (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), 
2016). According to the IRRBB, two risk measures, one with a market value perspective 
and one with an earnings approach, together provide a comprehensive understanding 
of interest rate risk for non-trading portfolios. The market value or economic value of 
equity looks at the current balance sheet of a financial institution, projects all cash flows 
until maturity, and therefore measures the long-term sensitivity to changes in the yield 
curve. The earnings based measure assumes a constant balance sheet including growth 
and renewal assumptions, but assesses the interest income at risk over a shorter time 
horizon. Despite affirming that both metrics are crucial for a successful management of 
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financial risks, the IRRBB does not clarify why changes in market value in the banking 
book – which contains assets being held to maturity – are of interest to financial 
institutions. The partner organization PRO, while having implemented a risk measure 
based on the market value perspective, realized that they are currently facing the 
problem that this approach is not tangible to credit unions. As a consequence, the 
following question arises: “What insights can market value sensitivity calculations bring 
to banking books and how can they be leveraged by credit unions in order to increase 
return on equity in the long run?”.  
A major concern for credit unions is the formulation of risk appetites based on 
market value sensitivities without having a real understanding of what those mean to 
their own balance sheet. Currently, there is very little research in this area. Only one 
paper written by Roberto Nygaard (Nygaard, n.d.), analyzes the relationship of earnings 
based measure and market value measure, but according to his findings, only the 
market value perspective only should be used to assess interest rate risk in the banking 
book. This consideration is the result of Nygaard’s analysis of the net interest income 
approach as it does not include any repricing of assets and liabilities and therefore does 
not provide a realistic picture of the risk profile. In this paper we will challenge 
Nygaard’s opinion. First, we will show that market value in reality is not a good measure 
for interest rate risk in the banking book. In a second step, we will further develop the 
net interest income approach by including a longer-time horizon and repricing of assets 
and liabilities, ultimately overcoming Nygaard’s man point of critique. This measure will 
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provide a suitable measure for interest rate risk in the banking book and, according to 
our findings, is clearly superior to market value. 
Unfortunately, other than the publication by Nygaard, no other researcher 
discussed the impact of market value perspective to the banking book, namely assets 
that be held to maturity, nor demystified what risk this approach actually measures, and 
how it relates to profitability. As a result, this paper will contribute crucial insights into 
this topic and will hopefully inspire various discussions in the future. 
In the past few years, a few researchers analyzed the market value view by 
focusing on its predictive power with regards to future market value. In 2002 an article 
by Jorion (Jorion, 2002) proved the importance Value at Risk (VaR) publications of U.S. 
commercial banks as powerful means to predict the volatility of future market value, 
but his research focused only on the effectiveness they hold on financial institution’s 
trading books and is therefore not applicable in our situation.  
A few years later Préfontaine and Desrochers (Préfontaine & Desrochers, 2006) went a 
step further and evaluated whether earnings could also be used as an indicator for 
future volatility of interest income, but, unfortunately, they did not find any conclusive 
proof to support their thesis. According to their studies, some U.S. banks have been 
using VaR, a market value measure, metrics for non-trading portfolios, but they did not 
provide further details on how this information is being used, if VaR has been actively 
used in the management of the non-trading portfolios, or if performance has been 
increased. A qualitative paper from 2007 (Randy Payant, 2007) supports the thesis that 
future interest income is contained in the economic value of equity which relates to the 
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issue discussed in this paper. However, the paper does not deliver any actual proof 
about the benefits for financial institutions when actively managing their portfolio 
following both short-term and long-term.  
In this project, we will focus our efforts to tie in with the previous research and 
we will try to provide a valuable insight of market value based risk measures. 
Additionally, we will provide examples of how PRO’s clients are currently being affected 
by it, what it means in terms of earnings and how they can improve their long-term 
portfolio management with respect to risk and return. To our knowledge, no such 
research exists that could deepen the market value based risk measures understanding 
of PRO’s clients and therefore help improve their financial performance. 
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3. Market value model 
3.1 Market value  
The market value of a liquid asset can usually be observed directly in the market. 
This is an important concept for traders, following investment strategies and holding 
most of their assets with the intention of selling them prior to maturity. As a result, 
knowing how the market value of the portfolio behaves is crucial for generating profits 
from investing activities. If no reliable market value is observable, the market value, or 
fair value can be calculated as sum of all discounted future cashflows. This concept 
calculates market value of fixed income instruments as function of its fixed cash flows 
and the variable – shocked – interest rates used for discounting. As a result, complete 
variable rate instruments will always have the same market value no matter the shock 
scenario, assuming that the variable rate is related to the risk-free rate used for 
discounting. Variable rate instruments therefore do not have a change in market value 
in the ALM model. This technique can be utilized for assets, liabilities, and equity. For 
the purposes of this paper, we calculate sensitivity of market value (Δ MV) as a change 
in market value for a 1% shock interval. In other words, we take the current yield curve 
and apply a parallel 50 bps shock up and down for the stress scenarios. MVUp is the 
market value of equity in the 50 bps up scenario and MVDown is the market value of 
equity in the 50 bps down scenario. Δ MV is then calculated as the difference of these 
two market values like in the following formula.   
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∆ MV =  MV𝑈𝑝  −  MV𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛 
In terms of an investment portfolio, this sensitivity directly estimates the risk 
related to changes in interest rates. If a trader’s portfolio loses market value, he is 
experiencing a loss. On the contrary, selling an asset when the market value is higher 
than the entry price, would result in a gain therefore directly affecting his profitability. 
We will later also express Δ MV as percentage of the market value of equity in the base 
scenario to compare sensitivities across different financial institutions.  
The calculation of Δ MW is first calculated for assets and liabilities, and then we 
can derive total sensitivity for equity by using the following formula, where equity is 
essentially inheriting the market value sensitivity from assets and liabilities. 
∆ MV =  ∆ MV𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦  = ∆ MV𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 − ∆ MV𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠  
The results of this paper focus on the change in market value of equity, if not 
indicated otherwise, Δ MV refers to equity sensitivity.  
It is worth noting, that Δ MV expresses the absolute difference of 2 market 
values. A negative Δ MV therefore results from a lower market value in the up scenario 
than in the down scenario. Overall, as value of equity decreases with rising rates and 
increases with falling rates, a negative Δ MV indicates an exposure to rising interest 
rates and, on the contrary, a positive Δ MV expresses an exposure to falling interest 
rates.  
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3.2 The ALM model 
For the purposes of this paper, we are calculating Δ MV with a typical asset 
liability management model (ALM model) utilized by PRO. The ALM model takes the 
current portfolio of a credit union as run off, without imposing any growth or renewal 
assumptions, and projects all future cash flows until the last asset or liability matures. In 
a second step, Δ MV is being calculated with the two stress scenarios mentioned in 
section 3.1. This method is like taking a snapshot of the credit union’s current balance 
sheet and provides insights about what would happen in case of a parallel change of the 
yield curve, all else being equal. When an asset or liability matures prior to the final cash 
flow of the ALM model, an asset or liability balancer will invest the amount matured at 
variable rates. As explained above, due to the variable nature of these balancers, they 
do not have an impact on Δ MV. 
3.3 ALM model results 
In this section, we will calculate Δ MV for 3 different credit unions after 
modifying the raw data to protect proprietary information of PRO and PRO’s clients. We 
will refer to them as credit unions A, B, and C or CU A, CU B, and CU C. All credit unions 
A, B, and C in our example have a total book value of assets of $10 billion on July 31, 
2017. Starting from this day, the ALM model projects 10 years into the future as this is 
the point in time where the last asset matures for all three credit unions. 
Figure 3-1 provides an overview of the different market value sensitivities for CU 
A, CU B, ad CU C. Although they all have an asset book value of $10 billion in July 2017, 
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they have quite different sensitivities of market value to changes in interest rates. Credit 
union B has with $-72 million the lowest absolute exposure, credit union C has with $-
134 almost twice as much sensitivity than credit union B. CU A lies with $-89 slightly 
above CU B.  
Figure 3-1 Results of Δ MV with data from July 31, 2017 for CU A, B, and C in $ millions. 
 
To provide an overview that allows for better comparison across the three credit 
unions, Figure 3-2 shows the results as percentage of market value of equity in the base 
– unshocked – scenario. The percentage overview highlights, that in relative terms CU 
has the lowest exposure and CU B the highest. CU C has a similar risk exposure 
compared to CU B. When comparing Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2 especially credit union B 
strikes our interest. CU B had the lowest risk measured in absolute terms, but – when 
expresses as % of equity – shows the highest exposure amongst the tree credit unions. 
This indicates, that the relative sensitivities should be used when comparing risks of 
different financial institutions, and we will use this technique in chapter 174 when 
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comparing NII and MV sensitivity for credit unions A, B, and C. Even though the 
percentage sensitivity seems low compared to equity, non-prudent interest rate risk 
management can jeopardize credit union’s financial stability. As a result, limit systems 
where sensitivities and their breaching of certain limits – the risk tolerance –  are 
monitored regularly and are crucial for the profitability of credit unions.  
Figure 3-2 Results of Δ MV with data from July 31, 2017 for CU A, B, and C as % of equity 
 
We take this results as a starting point to show in chapter 4 how market value and net 
interest income sensitivities are related.  
3.4 Δ MV and the banking book 
As mentioned earlier, Δ MV is a crucial tool for trading activities, namely for the 
trading book. However, it is still unclear which benefits Δ MV can bring for a credit 
union, or other financial institution, holding most of their assets until maturity. Or in 
other words, what insights does Δ MV provide to interest rate risk in the banking book?  
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The business model of a credit onion is not focused on generating profits 
through trading activities, but rather by investing in long-term assets such as loans and 
mortgages, funded by mostly short-term liabilities like deposits. As a result, credit 
unions earn the spread between lending and borrowing, and they are not affected by 
the change in market value in the banking book, as losses would only be materialized 
when assets are sold. As described earlier, assets in the banking book are usually held 
until maturity and this scenario is highly unlikely. The only realistic situation, where 
credit unions would sell assets from their banking book would be when they are forced 
to sell assets in order to generate additional cash. But is this still interest rate risk? Since 
the only situation where Δ MV can affect credit unions is a liquidity crisis, we are 
actually measuring the aftermaths of liquidity risk under the name of interest rate risk. 
This means Δ MV would provide us with an understanding of possible losses that would 
follow a liquidity crunch. This situation is particularly interesting, as Basel standards 
discuss tools to measure liquidity risk such as liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and Net 
Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) which measure liquidity risk over a 30 day and 1-year period 
respectively and calculate the capital required to avoid a liquidity event (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), 2014). Overall, the calculation of Δ MV in the 
banking book and the derivation of capital requirements appears to be a double count 
of liquidity risk and leads to a very conservative capital reserve. If we exclude Δ MV from 
the tools to measure interest rate risk in the banking book, what do we have left and 
what really is the interest rate risk in the banking book?  
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The main purpose of this paper is to challenge the meaning of Δ MV for credit 
unions and to investigate the relationship between Δ MV and Δ NII – the sensitivity of 
net interest income and ultimately the profitability of credit unions. Both are standard 
risk management tools for interest rate risk in the banking book and, as the IRRBB 
states, “banks should pay attention to the complementary nature of economic value 
and earnings-based measures in their risk and internal capital assessments”  (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), 2016). According to the BCBS the importance 
of both measures is especially highlighted by a few opposing components. They provide 
different results (net present value and earnings sensitivity), different time horizons (12 
months versus long-term), and different approaches to the balance sheet (run off versus 
going concern assumption). While there is no doubt regarding the existing differences of 
these two risk measures, it is the relationship of these two and the meaning of market 
value perspective for interest rate risk in the banking book that credit unions struggle 
with. To answer this question, chapter 4 investigates Δ NII and its relationship to Δ MV 
in more detail.  
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4. Net Interest Income Model 
This chapter will focus on the sensitivity of earnings. Understanding this process 
will allow us to better compare this method to Δ MV discussed above and to define the 
benefits they both bring to credit unions and other financial institutions.  
4.1 Net interest income 
As mentioned above, credit unions generate profits by earning the spread 
between lending and borrowing. The difference in interest earned and interest paid 
during a certain period is called net interest income (NII). NII is usually calculated for a 
12 months period and is therefore used as a short-term risk measure. Nonetheless, we 
will calculate Δ NII for the same period as we calculate Δ MV to then – in a third step – 
compare these two measures and show their connection. Like Δ MV, we define Δ NII as 
sensitivity of future earnings under the same parallel 50 bps up and down shock 
scenarios used for Δ MV. To compare the two measures, we will also express Δ NII as 
percentage of market value of equity in the base scenario. In practice, net interest 
income is always reported at future value, consistent to accounting standards. For the 
goal of this paper – and to show the relationship between Δ NII and Δ MV – we are 
defining Δ NII as the difference in discounted earnings, with the respective shocked 
discount factors, of the run off portfolio.   
∆ NII =  NII𝑈𝑝  −  NII𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛 
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In contrast to current regulatory standards of calculating earnings risk, more 
specifically the assumption of a constant balance sheet, we are not imposing any growth 
or renewal assumptions to the portfolio and measure earnings risk of the run off 
portfolio exactly as we previously did using the ALM model. These modifications differ 
from IRRBB standards, but are necessary to explain the similarities and differences of 
the two approaches.  
The methods used in this paper to calculate Δ MV and Δ NII are similar to those 
discussed by Roberto Nygaard (Nygaard, n.d.). We will start with the same 
methodologies, develop them further, but ultimately, arrive at a different conclusion. 
Nygaard raises concerns, over how the net interest income perspective does not include 
any repricing risk for assets and liabilities and therefore suggest the use of market value 
instead. As we showed above, market value is not suitable for measuring interest rate 
risk in the banking book. To overcome this issue, we are including repricing risk in the 
NII model and are therefore further developing the NII measure currently used in the 
industry and cited by Nygaard (Nygaard, n.d.). The following example illustrates the 
calculation of Δ MV and Δ NII for a simplified balance sheet. The example does not 
intend to replicate a realistic balance sheet of a credit union, but rather provide a basic 
understanding for Δ MV and Δ NII. In section 4.3, we will apply the methodologies to the 
entire balance sheet of three different credit unions, to make the two risk measures 
more tangible. For this example, we are looking at a single loan with a principal of 
$10,000 and yearly coupon payments of 7% (see Exhibit 4-1).  This loan is funded by 
term deposits maturing in three years and a coupon of 6%. After maturity, an asset 
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balancer kicks in and invests the principal at the implied forward rates, until the loan 
matures. One of the major points of criticism which Nygaard raised to the Δ NII concept 
was its lack of repricing risk. As a consequence of using the asset balancer, we managed 
to introduce pricing risk to the earning risk measure and therefore resolved one of the 
main concerns with Δ NII. In addition to Nygaard’s basic example, we are employing 
partial funding through equity as well as the different development of the portfolio 
under the shock scenarios Up and Down as introduced in chapter 10.  We assume, that 
cash flows received each year are not reinvested, as this would violate the run off 
character of our methodology. 
Exhibit 4-1 Example parameters 
 
Exhibit 4-2 shows how the loan and the term deposit develops over time in the Up and 
Down scenarios. The loan pays a yearly interest of 7% and the constant cash flows are 
discounted with the respective shocked discount factors. The Term deposit pays a yearly 
coupon of $540 (6% on $9,000) and matures in year 3. In year 4 the asset balancer 
invests the principal at the implied shocked forward rates, i.e. the interest payment is 
variable from year 4. The summary table in Exhibit 4-2 shows the sensitivity in market 
value for assets, liabilities and the portfolio sensitivity Δ MV of $-533, calculated from 
the discounted cash flows (DCF). The discounted earnings Δ NII show an overall portfolio 
sensitivity of $-497. Δ MV and Δ NII are different values and interestingly, Δ MV 
Assets Principal Coupon Maturity
Loan 10,000$       7% 10
Liabilities
Term Deposit 9,000$         6% 3
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indicates a higher risk than Δ NII. What causes these two numbers to differ? Could it be 
the introduced equity component? Equity is like funding assets at 0 cost, as a result Δ NII 
is 0 for equity as no interest is paid or earned. Additionally, equity is exposed to changes 
in market value, as the future value of equity also changes in the Up and Down scenario. 
This example introduces the doubt that equity increases risk when measured with Δ MV, 
even though funding assets with equity is considered very safe as no leverage exists. If a 
credit union were to fund all assets with equity, then all risk would be driven by the 
investments, and the credit union would not be exposed to risk of net interest income 
losses as long as lending rates stayed positive. Considering that credit unions normally 
do not sell their assets, as long as they do not face a liquidity crisis, is it correct to punish 
low leverage with higher capital requirements? 
Exhibit 4-2 Δ MV and Δ NII for a loan funded by Liabilities and Equity at 0 cost 
 
Based on the previous example, we want to examine if the difference of calculated risk 
indeed arises from the introduction of equity, namely funding the loan partially at 0 
Year Interest Principal DCF Interest Principal DCF Year Interest Principal DCF Interest Principal DCF
1 700       -        690       700       -        697       1 540       -        532       540       -        537       
2 700       -        673       700       -        686       2 540       -        519       540       -        529       
3 700       -        650       700       -        669       3 540       -        501       540       -        516       
4 700       -        622       700       -        647       4 406       -        361       316       -        292       
5 700       -        589       700       -        619       5 497       -        419       407       -        360       
6 700       -        553       700       -        586       6 588       -        465       498       -        417       
7 700       -        514       700       -        550       7 680       -        499       590       -        463       
8 700       -        474       700       -        511       8 771       -        522       681       -        498       
9 700       -        432       700       -        471       9 863       -        533       773       -        520       
10 700       10,000 5,975   700       10,000 6,569   10 955       9,000   5,559   865       9,000   6,056   
Σ 11,172 12,005 Σ 9,910   10,190 
∆ MV ∆ NII
Assets -833 -278
Liabilities -280 220
A - L -553 -497
Assets Liabilities
Summary
Up 50 bps Down 50 bps Up 50 bps Down 50 bps
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cost. Instead of assuming 0 cost for funding the remaining $1,000 by equity, we 
introduce a variable cost of equity as second source of funding, which can be 
interpreted as variable dividend payments, paying the implied shocked forward rates in 
the Up and Down scenario. As a matter of fact, after introducing the artificial dividend 
payments, which results in additional costs that the credit union would never 
experience in reality, the two risk measures Δ MV and Δ NII match exactly. In more 
detail, equity does not introduce any additional market value sensitivity, because it is a 
variable rate instrument. On the other hand, Δ NII of equity introduces additional risk to 
the earnings measure, which increases the earnings risk by $56, resulting in Δ MV and 
Δ NII of $-533.  
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Exhibit 4-3 Δ MV and Δ NII for a loan funded by Liabilities and Equity with variable cost 
 
 
These two examples confirm, that the two measures Δ MV and Δ NII are in fact 
related and furthermore, they treat capital structure differently. While Δ NII actually 
exposes credit unions to interest risk by taking only assets and liabilities into 
consideration, Δ MV – compared to Δ NII - imposes an additional risk premium for 
equity. As previously discussed, equity is not causing interest rate risk in the first place, 
but instead facilitates the risk-taking ability of financial institutions. Looking back at the 
previous examples, a shadow of doubt is being casted upon whether Δ MV really is a 
reasonable long-term risk measure for interest rate risk in the banking book. Not only is 
Year Interest Principal DCF Interest Principal DCF Year Interest Principal DCF Interest Principal DCF
1 700       -        690       700       -        697       1 540       -        532       540       -        537       
2 700       -        673       700       -        686       2 540       -        519       540       -        529       
3 700       -        650       700       -        669       3 540       -        501       540       -        516       
4 700       -        622       700       -        647       4 406       -        361       316       -        292       
5 700       -        589       700       -        619       5 497       -        419       407       -        360       
6 700       -        553       700       -        586       6 588       -        465       498       -        417       
7 700       -        514       700       -        550       7 680       -        499       590       -        463       
8 700       -        474       700       -        511       8 771       -        522       681       -        498       
9 700       -        432       700       -        471       9 863       -        533       773       -        520       
10 700       10,000 5,975   700       10,000 6,569   10 955       9,000   5,559   865       9,000   6,056   
Σ 11,172 12,005 Σ 9,910   10,190 
∆ MV ∆ NII
Assets -833 -278 Year Interest Principal DCF Interest Principal DCF
Liabilities -280 220 1 15         -        15         5           -        5           
Other L 0 56 2 25         -        24         15         -        15         
A - L -553 -553 3 35         -        33         25         -        24         
4 45         -        40         35         -        32         
5 55         -        47         45         -        40         
6 65         -        52         55         -        46         
7 76         -        55         66         -        51         
8 86         -        58         76         -        55         
9 96         -        59         86         -        58         
10 106       1,000   618       96         1,000   673       
Σ 1,000   1,000   
Summary Equity
Up 50 bps Down 50 bps
Assets Liabilities
Up 50 bps Down 50 bps Up 50 bps Down 50 bps
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Δ MV measuring outcomes of a liquidity crises as highlighted in section 3.4, but it also 
punishes financial institutions with additional capital requirements for holding equity.   
To further shed some light over this considerations and work with a more 
realistic example, we will build a similar model for entire balance sheets of three credit 
unions in the following section. 
4.2 The NII model 
This section ties in with the previous example and investigates the relationship of 
Δ MV and Δ NII for the entire balance sheet of the three different credit unions CU A, CU 
B, and CU C discussed in section 3.3. To implement the methodologies of the previous 
example into the model framework of PRO, we are taking the ALM model as a basis and 
perform necessary modifications in order to measure Δ NII appropriately. Fortunately, 
the NII model allows us to calculate Δ MV and Δ NII at the same time, as it does not 
impact the Δ MV calculations in any way.  
As a starting point for the NII model, we use the same assets, liabilities and time 
horizon of 10 years as in the ALM model and calculate Δ NII by employing monthly 
accrued interest and the shocked discount factors.  
In a first step, we take equity and all other non-interest sensitive (NIS) assets and 
liabilities as a total sum and impose variable costs. For the purposes of this paper, when 
we are talking about equity, we mean equity and other NIS instruments. Like in the 
previous section, the cost for funding with equity can be interpreted as paying a variable 
dividend. The cost on equity and other NIS instruments, as seen in the basic example, 
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are variable rate instruments and do not introduce additional market value sensitivity. 
To follow the same run off strategy as in the previous example, we create a counter 
position to retained earnings, as cash earning the variable 1 months implied forward 
rates (1 months CDOR). This cash position cancels out the effect that retained earnings 
would otherwise have on our calculations. Additionally, since it also represents a 
variable interest rate instrument in the NII model, it does not have any impact on Δ MV. 
This first step is intended to show that the identity of Δ MV and Δ NII still holds after 
introducing a cost for funding with equity, when we expand the basic example to a more 
complex situation.  
In a second step, we exclude the artificial effect that equity now has on the risk 
measure Δ NII and calculate the actual earnings risk credit unions would face, when 
being funded by debt and equity with 0 cost. Section 4.3 summarizes the results for CU 
A, CU B, and CU C and confirms the theory that Δ MV might expose credit unions to 
capital requirements that are too high for the nature of risk they are intended to 
measure, namely interest rate risk in the banking book. 
4.3 NII results 
Figure 4-1, Figure 4-3, and Figure 4-5 show the discounted earnings sensitivity 
Δ NII for each year and as total compared to Δ MV for CU A, CU B, and CU C respectively. 
All numbers are expressed as percentage of market value of equity in the base scenario. 
These outcomes support our thesis that the results from the basic example still hold 
true even when applied to a more realistic case like a full balance sheet. For all three 
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credit unions, Δ NII (expressed as blue bars) almost exactly sums up to Δ MV (red bars). 
The minor differences of Δ NII and Δ MV is due to rounding errors and modifications 
such as creating a counter position of cash to retained earnings in order to fulfil the “no 
reinvestment of cash flows” assumption of our example. These modifications bring us 
very close to a perfect match. However, these small differences are neglectable and 
overall the examples illustrate that the earnings based measure Δ NII equals the market 
value measure Δ MV, if all NIS instruments are excluded and invested at variable rates. 
As argued before, the additional risk that cost for equity and NIS instruments introduce 
are not reasonable, as they are caused by assumed dividend payments, but in reality, 
would never result in interest income or expense.  
To gauge the effect of the cost for funding with equity, Figure 4-2, Figure 4-4, 
and Figure 4-6 break down Δ NII (black squares) into the artificial component of Δ NII 
from other liabilities (red bars) and Δ NII actual (blue bars), the earnings sensitivity 
excluding the position of equity. All numbers are expressed as percentage of market 
value of equity in the base scenario. Although the three credit unions show different 
exposure to interest rate risk, three observations are true for all three credit unions.  
Firstly, equity dominates Δ NII, and drives the actual exposure to changes in interest 
rates. If we compare the black squares indicating Δ NII to Δ NII actual, represented by 
the blue bars as Δ NII excluding the forced cost for equity, we can clearly see that Δ NII 
is, in most cases, being shifted from a negative to a positive number.  Keeping in mind 
that the sum of the black squares equals the overall Δ MV, it becomes clear how Δ MV is 
including unnecessary additional risk that was imposed on the credit unions balance 
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sheet. The shift from negative Δ NII to positive Δ NII actual is significant. This means, 
Δ NII (and therefore Δ MV) suggests an increased risk to rising interest rates compared 
to falling rates as the discounted earnings would lose in value in the Up scenario 
compared to the Down scenario. Given the fact that Δ NII is mostly driven by cost for 
equity which imposes a huge amount of variable debt to the portfolio, drastically 
reduces NII as rates rise, because assets reprice at a later time than the variable 
dividend payments. It is clear to see in the three figures, that most Δ NII actual is in the 
first 5 years when liabilities reprice, but most assets are still generating the same fixed 
coupon. After year 5, when most assets matured, net interest income risk almost 
disappears, due to the pure variability of asset balancer and other liabilities. On the 
other hand, Δ NII actual being positive has the opposite interpretation, implying that 
credit unions would – under the current market conditions – profit from rising interest 
rates, as the low leverage provides a buffer for funding assets. 
Secondly, all three credit unions illustrated how a short-term perspective of 12 months 
is not really a good representation of the credit union’s exposure to interest as Δ NII and 
Δ NII actual change significantly over time. CU B has its highest potential to benefit from 
rising interest rates in year 1 as more assets reprice compared to liabilities. In year 2 the 
sensitivity drops to a negative value, as less assets reprice compared to equity and 
liabilities. After year 2 Δ NII actual changes back to positive and continues to increase, 
highlighting the chance to benefit from rising interest risks in the long term as the entire 
portfolio reprices. A similar pattern is observable for CU A, with the difference that Δ NII 
actual never becomes negative and CU A has its highest potential to benefit from rising 
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interest rates in year 6, after all fixed rate assets matured. CU C overall shows a more 
consistent exposure to Δ NII actual, slightly decreasing in year 2 and also showing the 
highest opportunity to generate NII in year 6 after the last asset matured and all assets 
are completely reinvested in variable interest rates by the asset balancer. The different 
patterns and sensitivities to Δ NII actual across different years, indicate that Δ NII actual 
provides valuable information about the real exposure to interest rate risks and should 
therefore be taken into consideration for the long term. Lastly, Δ NII indicates an 
interest rate risk of almost 0 for all three credit unions from year 6 to 10, however the 
more realistic measure Δ NII actual has a significant sensitivity for these 5 years. This 
fact indicates that Δ MV is not only imposing unnecessary capital requirements caused 
by equity, but in some instances, underestimates the actual sensitivity. It appears that 
credit unions are not facing any interest rate risk from year 6 onwards, but in reality, as 
interest rates decline all assets and liabilities are repriced at variable rates directly 
exposing the credit unions to falling net interest income. 
Exhibit 4-4 summarizes the total sums for Δ MV, Δ NII, Δ NII actual, and the 
leverage ratio implied from the NII model. The leverage ratio is calculated by dividing 
liabilities by equity. As mentioned before, Δ NII and Δ NII actual differ significantly as 
they often show opposite values, from positive to negative. Overall, Δ NII, which is the 
equivalent to Δ MV in our model, punishes credit unions for holding capital with 
additional risk calculated, whereas Δ NII actual considers more equity correctly as a 
mitigation of risk and therefore highlights the increased risk-taking ability. 
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In conclusion, calculating interest rate risk in the banking book through the 
market value perspective of Δ MV does not seem reasonable considering it is highly 
driven by holding equity and therefore overstating the risk. Additionally, Δ MV does not 
represent the outcomes of a liquidity crisis and therefore not only measures liquidity 
risk under the name of interest rate risk, but also calculates the aftermaths of a liquidity 
crisis as actual risk itself. On the contrary, Δ NII provides a reasonable measure of 
interest rate risk for the banking book, as it measures what credit unions are really 
exposed to: changes in net interest income or in other words – their profitability. 
Although Δ NII is usually assumed to be a short-term measure, we find the presented 
results provide enough reasons to expand the concept to the long-term and as a result 
better understand the actual interest rate in the banking book for credit unions and any 
other financial institution. 
Figure 4-1 CU A: Relationship of Δ MV and Δ NII 
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Figure 4-2 CU A: Δ NII versus Δ NII actual 
 
 
 
Figure 4-3 CU B: Relationship of Δ MV and Δ NII 
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Figure 4-4 CU B: Δ NII versus Δ NII actual 
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Figure 4-5 CU C: Relationship of Δ MV and Δ NII 
 
 
 
Figure 4-6 CU C: Δ NII versus Δ NII actual 
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Exhibit 4-4 Summary sensitivities as % of MV equity and leverage 
 
 
 
 
∆ MV ∆ NII ∆ NII actual Leverage
CU A -2.5% -2.5% 5.3% 1.88
CU B -3.1% -3.2% 5.0% 3.11
CU C -3.0% -3.0% 6.6% 0.85
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5. Conclusion 
In conclusion, we provided a better understanding of the two risk measures 
Δ MV and Δ NII and their relation. We discovered that Δ MV might not be suitable for 
measuring interest rate risk in the banking book for two reasons. Firstly, Δ MV actually 
measures the effects of a liquidity crisis and therefore should not be captured under 
interest rate risk as it imposes additional capital requirements for liquidity risk, which 
are already covered under liquidity risk management. Specifically, Δ MV is causing a 
double count of a liquidity crunch, forcing higher capital requirements on financial 
institutions. The second reason is that Δ MV equals Δ NII only when we impose an 
artificial cost for equity and other NIS securities. This modification highlights that Δ MV 
is including a punishment for holding capital, but in general capital should reduce 
financial risk for credit unions and other financial institutions and not cause it. 
We explored Δ NII and the adaption of this measure to the long-term. After we 
showed the relation between Δ NII and Δ MV, we calculated Δ NII actual, which 
measures the actual earnings risk of credit unions excluding the artificial cost for capital 
that was introduced. According to our research, Δ NII actual should be given a higher 
importance than Δ MV when managing interest rate risk in the banking book for three 
reasons. Δ NII actual measures the interest rate risk arising from the banking book, 
namely the profitability of credit unions. It does not discipline credit unions for holding 
  34 
equity. When expanded to the long-term, it provides crucial information about credit 
union’s risk exposure that a 12 months measure cannot demonstrate.  
We highly recommend challenging the meaning and usefulness of Δ MV when 
managing interest rate risk in the banking book and recommend expanding the horizon 
of earnings based measures to the longer-term, as Δ NII actual can valuable insight to 
manage risk and, as a result, improve profitability. 
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